TOP ARTICLE
Our moral universe
Has our moral universe shrunk? Not the aam admi's. He struggles to keep body and soul together in the face of rising prices and falling values. His moral code has remained constant. The moral universe which has visibly shrunk is the politician's and that of his complicit associates: bureaucrats, policemen and an army of faceless but brazenly corrupt officials. The government's proposed anti-corruption ordinance begs the question: why does it not first enforce the existing Prevention of Corruption Act against its tainted ministers? It has forced several to resign but has not prosecuted even one.
Economic reforms will be 20 years old this July. Without political reforms, however, the full benefits of economic liberalisation won't reach the poor. The nexus between vested political and business interests, fused by lobbyists and middlemen, erodes those benefits. The reason poverty remains intractable inIndia is that good economic governance needs the protective umbrella of good political governance. Without that, both privilege and poverty will persist.
A fish rots from the head down, never from the tail up. The top political leadership sets the standard of governance. If that standard is set low, corruption infects the entire body politic. Every recent public scam involving leaders of the Congress and other parties can be traced to this systemic rot. Three key political reforms - police, judicial and electoral - are necessary to cleanse our public institutions.
In 2006, the Supreme Court directed the government to implement police reform. Make the National Police Commission autonomous, the court ordered, and give it a structure that is independent of political control. The National Police Commission would independently decide salaries, promotions, transfers, weaponry. Political control would go. Law enforcement, capricious today, would become professional and accountable. Successive governments - both in the states and at the Centre - have ignored the Supreme Court directive. They continue to do little for police welfare. Officers are badly paid and have become institutionally corrupt. They serve the wrong master - politicians. In the process, they betray those they are paid to protect: ordinary citizens. Unless we have an independent, professional police force, law enforcement will continue to work against the public interest, not for it.
An exasperated Chief Justice of India, Sarosh Kapadia, last month finally ordered the chief secretaries of Maharashtra, West Bengal, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh to implement the 2006 Supreme Court directive on police reform. After defying this directive for five years, the states have now promised to fall in line. But will they? History suggests they will not. The full-bodied police reform the Supreme Court wants may remain a chimera. On cue, the Centre on January 10, 2011 asked the court to dilute some provisions of the 2006 directive. Clearly, the government will relinquish control over the law enforcement machinery only if it is compelled to by being cited for contempt, a stick the Supreme Court may yet have to wield.
Judicial reform is the second systemic political change needed to restore the credibility of our institutions. The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (and the under-preparation Right to Justice Bill) must be implemented in letter and spirit. Too few judges sit in our courts. Lawyers are complicit in the endless adjournments that bedevil the entire legal system. Just as the police owe primary allegiance to politicians and not the public (which pays for both but gets good service from neither), the judiciary frequently ends up serving the interests of the powerful, not the deserving.
The proposed Indian Legal Service (ILS) and Indian Judicial Service (IJS) could advance several reforms: fast-track courts, a separate stream of specialised courts for financial disputes, strict penalties against lawyers for serial adjournments and a performance rating system for the promotion of judges. The IJS will add 25,000 judges to the 27,000 lower-court judges currently weighed down by 25 million pending litigations. Without sweeping judicial reforms, the average citizen will continue to be a victim, not beneficiary, of the law.
The third key reform is electoral. Black money and criminality combine to send to Parliament several men and women unfit for public office. The Election Commission (EC) should follow two lines of action to disinfect the system. First, legally debar candidates with criminal charges against them (murder, rape, kidnap) from standing for election. Will that punish a few 'innocent' victims who have been falsely implicated by political enemies? Not if the EC reviews the chargesheets against such candidates and makes an independent, robust decision. Chief Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi recently publicly backed this move.
The EC, in its second reform, must frame rules to make donations to political parties transparent. Each candidate would be entitled to a fixed quantum of state funding. He would be allowed private funds only under strict audit through declared private donors. This transparent funding model will cut the advantage cash-rich candidates have over poorer, but cleaner, candidates.
Systemic corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Political reforms that remove our key public institutions from government control can make 2011 the definitive year for sweeping institutional change just as 1991 was the inflection point for economic liberalisation. That would greatly expand our moral universe.
The writer is an author and chairman of a media group.
Economic reforms will be 20 years old this July. Without political reforms, however, the full benefits of economic liberalisation won't reach the poor. The nexus between vested political and business interests, fused by lobbyists and middlemen, erodes those benefits. The reason poverty remains intractable inIndia is that good economic governance needs the protective umbrella of good political governance. Without that, both privilege and poverty will persist.
A fish rots from the head down, never from the tail up. The top political leadership sets the standard of governance. If that standard is set low, corruption infects the entire body politic. Every recent public scam involving leaders of the Congress and other parties can be traced to this systemic rot. Three key political reforms - police, judicial and electoral - are necessary to cleanse our public institutions.
In 2006, the Supreme Court directed the government to implement police reform. Make the National Police Commission autonomous, the court ordered, and give it a structure that is independent of political control. The National Police Commission would independently decide salaries, promotions, transfers, weaponry. Political control would go. Law enforcement, capricious today, would become professional and accountable. Successive governments - both in the states and at the Centre - have ignored the Supreme Court directive. They continue to do little for police welfare. Officers are badly paid and have become institutionally corrupt. They serve the wrong master - politicians. In the process, they betray those they are paid to protect: ordinary citizens. Unless we have an independent, professional police force, law enforcement will continue to work against the public interest, not for it.
An exasperated Chief Justice of India, Sarosh Kapadia, last month finally ordered the chief secretaries of Maharashtra, West Bengal, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh to implement the 2006 Supreme Court directive on police reform. After defying this directive for five years, the states have now promised to fall in line. But will they? History suggests they will not. The full-bodied police reform the Supreme Court wants may remain a chimera. On cue, the Centre on January 10, 2011 asked the court to dilute some provisions of the 2006 directive. Clearly, the government will relinquish control over the law enforcement machinery only if it is compelled to by being cited for contempt, a stick the Supreme Court may yet have to wield.
Judicial reform is the second systemic political change needed to restore the credibility of our institutions. The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (and the under-preparation Right to Justice Bill) must be implemented in letter and spirit. Too few judges sit in our courts. Lawyers are complicit in the endless adjournments that bedevil the entire legal system. Just as the police owe primary allegiance to politicians and not the public (which pays for both but gets good service from neither), the judiciary frequently ends up serving the interests of the powerful, not the deserving.
The proposed Indian Legal Service (ILS) and Indian Judicial Service (IJS) could advance several reforms: fast-track courts, a separate stream of specialised courts for financial disputes, strict penalties against lawyers for serial adjournments and a performance rating system for the promotion of judges. The IJS will add 25,000 judges to the 27,000 lower-court judges currently weighed down by 25 million pending litigations. Without sweeping judicial reforms, the average citizen will continue to be a victim, not beneficiary, of the law.
The third key reform is electoral. Black money and criminality combine to send to Parliament several men and women unfit for public office. The Election Commission (EC) should follow two lines of action to disinfect the system. First, legally debar candidates with criminal charges against them (murder, rape, kidnap) from standing for election. Will that punish a few 'innocent' victims who have been falsely implicated by political enemies? Not if the EC reviews the chargesheets against such candidates and makes an independent, robust decision. Chief Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi recently publicly backed this move.
The EC, in its second reform, must frame rules to make donations to political parties transparent. Each candidate would be entitled to a fixed quantum of state funding. He would be allowed private funds only under strict audit through declared private donors. This transparent funding model will cut the advantage cash-rich candidates have over poorer, but cleaner, candidates.
Systemic corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Political reforms that remove our key public institutions from government control can make 2011 the definitive year for sweeping institutional change just as 1991 was the inflection point for economic liberalisation. That would greatly expand our moral universe.
The writer is an author and chairman of a media group.
Read more: Our moral universe - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Our-moral-universe/articleshow/7361599.cms#ixzz1CJzt0uZK
1 comment:
The main and defining issue for bringing about good policing is the issue of how the police will be supervised; the political executive must always have the control of policing but not the police; the spheres of competence must be properly defined; this is being strongly resisted; here is a formulation which will make it clear what the political executives powers are and what the powers of the police chief are; nothing could be clearer if formulated this way and this is the way in which in many jurisdictions where policing is of high standard word their statutes.
Powers of the political executive:
“(3) The Administrator may give the Commissioner of Police
directions on matters of government policy that relate to:
i) the prevention of crime;
ii) the maintenance of public safety and public order;
iii) the delivery of police service; and
iv) general areas of law enforcement.
(4) No direction from the Administrator to the Commissioner of
Police may have the effect of requiring the non-enforcement
of a particular area of law
(5) The Administrator must not give directions to the
Commissioner of Police in relation to the following:
i) enforcement of the criminal law in particular cases and
classes of cases
ii) matters that relate to an individual or group of
individuals
iii) decisions on individual members of the police
(6) If there is dispute between the Administrator and the
Commissioner of Police in relation to any direction under this
section, the Administrator must, as soon as practicable after
the dispute arises,
i) provide that direction to the Commissioner of Police in
writing; and
ii) publish a copy in the Gazette; and
iii) present a copy to the Legislature"
Powers of the police chief:
"(1) The Commissioner of Police shall be responsible to the
Administrator for:
(a) carrying out the functions and duties of the police;
(b) the general conduct of the police;
(c) the effective, efficient, and economical management of
the police;
(d) tendering advice to the administrator; and
(e) giving effect to any lawful directions.
(2) The Commissioner of Police shall act independently of the
Administrator regarding:
(a) the maintenance of order in relation to any individual or
group of individuals; and
(b) the enforcement of the law in relation to any individual
or group of individuals; and
(c) the investigation and prosecution of offences; and
(d) decisions about individual police officers."
Post a Comment